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DIRECTION, CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY
OF CROWN CORPORATIONS: REVIEW AND
ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS
By ROBERT W. SEXTY*
I. INTRODUCTION
A series of events in recent years has motivated the Government of
Canada to attempt formulation of a more adequate policy towards public
enterprises. The Estey Inquiry into Air Canada1 and Parliamentary inquiries
into Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd.2 and Polysar Ltd.3 all examined ques-
tionable business practices that embarrassed the Government. The Auditor
General's 1976 Report included a financial management and control study of
Crown corporations that was critical of accounting and financial reporting
practices.4 The post-inflation control report, The Way Ahead: A Framework
for Discussion,5 emphasized the lessening of the role of government, including
"privatization" relating to Crown corporations.
There have been several developments as a result of these events. Spe-
cific legislation relating to Crown corporations, such as the Air Canada Act,
1977,6 has been passed or introduced in Parliament. The Royal Commission
on Financial Management and Accountability is studying the whole question
of fiscal control and responsibility in federal organizations. Finally, the Privy
Council Office released a report, Crown Corporations: Direction, Control,
© Copyright, 1979, Robert W. Sexty.
* Mr. Sexty is an Associate Professor at the School of Business Administration and
Commerce, Memorial University, St. John's.
1 Can. Air Canada Inquiry Report (Estey Report) (Ottawa: Information Canada,
1975).
2 Can. H. of C. Standing Committee on Public Accounts, Proceedings, No. 60 (May
18, 1976), No. 64 (June 1, 1976), No. 3 (Nov. 15, 1977), No. 4 (Nov. 17, 1977), No.
5 (Nov. 22, 1977).
Z Can. H. of C. Second Report of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts
(The Polysar Report), Proceedings, No. 39 (July 7, 1977) at 3-18. See also, Can. H. of
C. Standing Committee on Public Accounts, Proceedings, Nos. 19-29 (March 1, 1977-
April 19, 1977), No. 38 (June 21-23, 1977), No. 39 (June 28 and July 5, 1977).
4 Can. Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons for
the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1976 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1976)
at 223-302.
5 Can. Privy Council Office, The Way Ahead: A Framework for Discussion
(Ottawa: October, 1976).
6 S.C. 1977-78, c. 5.
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Accountability,7 containing the Government's proposals, including draft legis-
lation on the management and control of Crown corporations.
The Government has stated that the proposals contained in the Privy
Council report were designed to achieve four basic objectives:
1. to clarify the relationship between Crown corporations, the Govern-
ment and Parliament;
2. to define within that relationship the respective duties and respon-
sibilities of the boards of directors and heads of Crown corporations,
individual ministers, Cabinet and Parliament;
3. to provide to the Government the means whereby ministers may
fulfill their responsibilities for Crown corporations to Parliament;
and
4. to ensure that Parliament is provided with sufficient information to
hold the Government and Crown corporations accountable for their
actions.8
The purpose of this paper is to review the proposals and to analyze them to
ascertain whether the proposals can fulfill the objectives established. The
concluding section of the paper will examine the social audit as a mechanism
for monitoring whether Crown corporations operate in the national interest.
If. SUMMARY OF THE REPORT
The report clarified several variables in the discussion of public enter-
prises in the Canadian setting. The difficulties identified by the report were:
1. the problem of defining a "Crown corporation;"
2. the need for independence if Crown corporations are to function
effectively; and
3. the lack of consistency in the relationship between the Government
and Crown corporations.
In an effort to ascertain exactly to which public enterprises the proposals
were applicable, the report classified Canadian public enterprises into three
types:
1. Crown corporations defined in the Financial Administration Act
(FAA) as Schedule B (departmental corporations), Schedule C
(agency corporations) and Schedule D (proprietary corporations);9
7 Can. Privy Council Office, Crown Corporations: Direction, Control, Accountabil-
ity. Government of Canada's Proposals (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1977).
8 Press release by the President of the Privy Council, Ottawa, August 18, 1977.
9 R.S.C. 1970, c. F-10, ss. 66(1) and (3). The three types of Crown corporation
are defined thus: a Departmental Corporation is a servant or agent of Her Majesty in
right of Canada, and is responsible for administrative, supervisory, or regulatory services
of a governmental nature (e.g., National Research Council, Fisheries Prices Support
Board); an Agency Corporation is an agent for Her Majesty in right of Canada, and
is responsible for the management of trading or service operations on a quasi-commercial
basis, or for the management of procurement, construction, or disposal on behalf of Her
Majesty in right of Canada (e.g., Canadian Dairy Commission, Uranium Canada, Ltd.);
a Proprietary Corporation is responsible for the management of lending or financial
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2. enterprises partially owned by the Government, such as the Canada
Development Corporation and Panarctic Oils Ltd.; and
3. wholly-owned government corporations not under the authority of
the FAA, but incorporated under the Canada Corporations Act.'0
Examples include Canadair Ltd. and de Havilland Aircraft of Canada
Ltd.
The report points out the lack of consistency in classifying which public
enterprises are Crown corporations and establishes that, for the purposes of
the report and the draft legislation, those public enterprises considered to
be Crown corporations will be those listed in Schedules B, C, and D of the
FAA."
The report claims that Crown corporations require a degree of inde-
pendence from the Government. Independence from Parliamentary scrutiny
of the day-to-day operations is required for the following reasons:
1. to attract businessmen to the management of an entrepreneurial
activity on behalf of the public;
2. to protect the commercial secrecy of Crown corporations operating
in competitive circumstances; and
3. to remove the Crown corporation from the personnel and budgetary
constraints that accompany departmental administration.'
2
The report also discusses the lack of consistency in the existing relation-
ship between the Government and Crown corporations. Most Crown corpora-
tions report to an "appropriate minister," but the extent of control varies and
might take any one of the following forms:
1. mere "reporting";
2. approval of annual operating and capital budgets;
3. the power to direct the corporation respecting the exercise or per-
formance of corporate powers; or
4. where the corporation is incorporated under letters patent, the exer-
cise of considerable influence by the Minister acting as a shareholder.' 3
operations, and for the management of commercial or industrial operations that supply
services to the public, or that produce or deal in goods; a Proprietary Corporation is
ordinarily required to conduct its operations without parliamentary appropriations (e.g.,
Cape Breton Development Corporation, Teleglobe Canada).
10 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-32, as amended by c. 10 (1st Supp.).
11 The Government proposes to retain the existing classification of Crown Corpora-
tions under the FAA, but intends to eliminate the present criteria for identifying cor-
porations that are to be included in each class. The Crown Corporations report states
that "Crown corporations would then be listed in a particular Schedule, not by what they
do, but by the degree of financial management and control over them required by the
government." (See supra note 7, at 39.) The Report of the Auditor General, 1976
asserts that the FAA classification should be re-examined, and that two different groups
be created, "one for all financially dependent corporations or those carrying on opera-
tions of a governmental nature [and] the other for all corporations meeting the test of
financial viability and carrying on commercial activities." (See supra note 4, at 52.)
12 Crown Corporations, supra note 7, at 16.
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The report concludes that Crown corporations, as instruments of the
Crown, are represented by the appropriate Minister and the Governor in
Council. The purpose of the proposals in the report is to clarify and to in-
crease the consistency in the relationships between the Government and
Crown corporations.
The role of Crown corporations is discussed in the report. It states that
since Crown corporations are instruments for the advancement of broader
policy objectives, each Crown corporation "must pursue whatever national
objectives are defined by Parliament."' 4 A draft of the proposed legislation,
to be known as the Crown Corporations Act, contains a declaration that the
corporations are wholly owned by the Government and that they are to serve
as instruments for the advancement of the national interest. The clause reads:
Role of Crown Corporations
4. It is hereby declared that every Crown corporation is constituted an instrument
for advancing the national interests of Canada, and that in order to best advance
those national interests, it is the duty of the directors of every Crown corporation
when managing the Crown corporation to take into consideration the national
interests of Canada as well as the interests of the Crown corporation and, within
the scope of their powers and the powers of the Crown corporation, to pursue
those corporate policies that best advance such national interests.15
In an effort to define Crown corporations more adequately, to grant
them some independence, and to clarify reporting relationships, and yet at the
same time to ensure that Crown corporations serve in the national interest,
the Government's proposed legislation will establish the appropriate Minister
as the "focal point in the government's policy direction, control and account-
ability of a particular corporation."'1
The Table summarizes existing and proposed direction, control and
accountability practices for Crown corporations. Some of the rationales for
the proposed changes and difficulties associated with them are discussed in
the following section.
III. EXAMINATION OF THE PROPOSALS
In implementing directive powers, the Government is seeking a process
whereby it may, on a continuous basis, "communicate broad policy objectives
to the corporations and whereby the corporations must account to govern-
ment and Parliament for the achievement of those objectives."'' 7 The Gov-
ernment feels that directive power is essential if Crown corporations are to
be effective instruments in the achievement of broad policy objectives, that
is, in furthering the national interest.
The Air Canada Inquiry Report recommended that the Government give
consideration "to the redesign of the Air Canada Act to establish a channel
whereby the Executive Board of Government can issue to the Board of Direc-
tors of the corporation policy directives where the national interest from time
14 Id. at 22.
15 Id. at 50.
16 Id. at 21.
17 Id. at 23.
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to time requires."' 8 The Auditor General recommended that Governmental
objectives and priorities, detailed enough to provide appropriate guidance,
"should be communicated formally to Crown corporations on a timely basis."19
In his 1977 report, the Auditor General felt the Government's proposals both
recognized the problem and provided the means for its resolution. 20
Even though the Government wants a continuing mechanism to com-
municate broad policy objectives, it does not intend to resort to the use of
the directive in a continuous fashion. It is assumed that Crown corporations
will, in most cases, operate in a satisfactory manner as controlled by budgets
and reports. It is not clear how pointed the directives will be, and since broad
policy objectives are difficult to define, there would appear to be a consider-
able area of discretion for the management of Crown corporations. This is
particularly true in the case of Schedule D corporations where directives are
to be of a general nature. The approach appears to differ little from that in
operation now, and will rely on the good judgment and competence of
management.
The report's discussion of the principle of compensation presents some
problems in administration. The report states that the efficiency and projects
of Schedule D corporations are to be measured by commercial criteria. This
is the rationale reimbursing corporations for losses sustained from carrying
out uneconomic activities as a direct result of a government directive. The
report states:
mhe profit and loss statements of such Crown corporations [Schedule D] can
provide to the government and Parliament a clear and objective method by which
the performance of corporate management may be assessed. The Government
wishes to encourage the managements of proprietary Crown corporations to
operate on a sound commercial basis, to promote their efficiency and maximize
the return on the investment of the Canadian taxpayer.21
Yet, in the following paragraph, the report states:
The policy as defined above is not meant to imply that Schedule D corporations
should pursue commercial objectives and maximize returns on investment in the
same way as would a private sector corporation or that the corporate financial
statements would be judged on the same basis as occurs in the private sector.22
Since some policies and objectives, such as those of the Official Lan-
guages Act,2 are to be achieved as a matter of course with no expectations
of compensation for any losses that might occur, the report continues by
stating that:
Corporate management will be judged on the basis of their performance in the
pursuit of such public policy objectives as well as those of a commercial nature.
Since such objectives are seldom viable in a strictly commercial sense, it would
18 Air Canada Inquiry Report, supra note 1, at 281.
19 Report of the Auditor General of Canada, 1976, supra note 4, at 54.
20 Can. Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons for
the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1977 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1977)
at 113.
21 Crown Corporations, supra note 7, at 25.
22 Id.
23 R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-2.
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be unfair to expect Schedule D corporations to achieve the same level of return
on investment as their private sector congeners. 2 4
For the management of Schedule D corporations, these statements must
present a contradiction. The Government appears to be saying "yes" to profits
and then inserting a "maybe" qualifier. It is doubtful that profit and loss state-
ments will provide the clear and objective method of assessment envisaged.
The mechanisms for determining the amount of compensation and thus,
profits, are not specified. One question will be whether the Government ex-
pects Crown corporations to receive compensation equal to the costs of carry-
ing out the non economic directive, or compensation equal to costs plus some
margin of profit. Another question involves who will ascertain the amount
of the compensation a Crown corporation should receive: the minister, the
corporation, or an independent adjudicator.
Regulating the creation of subsidiary companies is intended merely to
control their proliferation, and to obtain knowledge of their existence. Finan-
cial reporting will also have to be separate from that of the parent corpora-
tion so that subsidiaries can be evaluated independently. These regulations
are not unreasonable, and subsidiary accounting is being advocated even in
the private sector.
The Government wishes the role of the directors to be an active and
effective one in the management of Crown corporations. Of course, the board
of directors is a source of real control over Crown corporations as directors
are appointed and can be dismissed by the Government. The proposed Act
describes the directors' duties as:
20. (1) Every director and officer of a Crown corporation in exercising his
powers and discharging his duties shall:
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of Canada
and, in so far as is not incompatible with the best interests of Canada, the best
interests of the Crown corporation; and
(b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person exer-
cises in comparable circumstances.X5
This requirement places a legal burden on directors to ascertain what is in
the best interests of Canada. It would be more appropriate to limit the respon-
sibility of directors to carrying out the directives of the Government which
presumably should incorporate the national interest. It might be argued that
this section of the draft legislation be replaced with the comparable section
from the Canada Business Corporations Act that applies to directors in the
private sector.
26
The Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons has recom-
mended that the "responsible ministers be adequately represented on boards
24 Crown Corporations, supra note 7, at 26.
2
5 ld. at 56-57.
2 6 Canada Business Corporations Act, S.C. 1974-75, c. 33. Section 117 provides that
they must ".... act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interest of the
corporation; and (b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent
person would exercise in comparable circumstances."
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of directors of Crown corporations."'27 The size and composition of the board
of directors could be an important control mechanism, yet no mention of
these was made in the Government's proposals.
The report specifically discusses the salaries of chief executive officers.
Because of the inconsistency in and lack of control over salaries, the Govern-
ment is proposing that approval be required for chief executive officers'
salaries. This feature takes on significance when it is recalled that a section
of the report argued for the independence of Crown corporations from the
personnel and budgeting constraints that accompany departmental adminis-
tration. The establishment of chief executive salaries in effect establishes
salary levels for all persons in the corporation. Furthermore, consideration
must be given to the competitiveness for managerial talent in a particular
industry. The establishment of chief executive salaries would best be left as
the responsibility of the board of directors.
In the future, no Crown corporations are to be created without the
approval of the Governor in Council. This appears to be another procedural
mechanism for maintaining control of the numbers and types of Crown
corporations created.
The Government intends to extend its direction, control and account-
ability of Crown corporations through the more effective use of corporate
budgets, corporate plans, annual reports, corporate financial statements and
interim statements of accounts. All these mechanisms have been utilized by
large business corporations for some time. The amount of information that
could be extracted from Crown corporations through these mechanisms and
made public appears to be inconsistent with the Government's desire not to
harm the competitive position of those Crown corporations operating in a
commercial environment. Management, in the private or public sectors, have
control over the information to be supplied and can influence the range and
quality of what it must tell. Reports, and even financial statements, will be
stated in ways to make the corporation look as good as possible. Even with
an elaborate set of reporting mechanisms, the Government may not obtain the
information that they feel they need. It should be remembered that obtaining
information is only one aspect of accountability. Meaningful utilization of
the information by the Government is another matter. No matter how elabo-
rate the reporting system, there is no assurance that the information will be
used effectively.
There are other considerations of importance in the reporting mecha-
nisms proposed. The various reporting requirements may present some timing
problems for all concerned. It will be difficult to reconcile the submissions of
various reports with government and corporation year-ends and Parliamentary
sessions. Finally, the reporting requirements could be simplified by having
all reports submitted to the appropriate Minister, who in turn would forward
them to other agencies. Likewise, requests for reports should come through
the appropriate Minister. On this matter of financial plans, the Auditor Gen-
27 Second Report of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts, supra note 3,
at 16.
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eral stated that such plans should be presented to Parliament, particularly
where a Crown corporation needs significant amounts of public funds.28 The
Auditor General also proposed that "a central agency should be responsible
for monitoring Crown corporation results."29
Two other matters of substance were dealt with in the report: the ap-
pointment of auditors and borrowing powers. The appointment of auditors is
to be more formalized and consistent. If the procedure for naming an auditor
is not specified by an act of Parliament, the Governor in Council will appoint
an auditor. In its July 7, 1977 Report, the House of Commons Public
Accounts Committee recommended that:
The Board of Directors of each Crown corporation should form an audit commit-
tee of directors at least a majority of whom are not otherwise connected with
the Crown corporation.2 O
The Auditor General agreed with this recommendation and pointed out that
the Canada Business Corporations Act requires private sector corporations
to have audit committees.31 The suggestion for an audit committee appears
reasonable and should be incorporated into future revisions of the Act.
Crown corporations are to be allowed greater freedom in borrowing in
the capital markets, but there are also clearly established procedures to fol-
low. The Government wants to give Crown corporations greater flexibility in
their financing, thus exposing them to the demands of the private capital
markets, and curtailing the cash drain when Crown corporations borrow from
the Government. Nonetheless, the end result may be the same: Crown cor-
porations will be borrowing on their own resources, but resources guaranteed
indirectly by the Government. If the Crown corporation could finance itself
in the capital markets, it could be independent of government control. The
Government may have anticipated this possibility and thus required certain
borrowing approval mechanisms.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSALS
There are several implications arising from the proposals contained in
the legislation that should concern the Government. The first implication
involves the commercial criteria for evaluation purposes. The evaluation of
Crown corporations' performance on commercial criteria raises the question
of the meaning and goals of public enterprise. Pressure for efficiency, that is,
profits, might lead to a disregard for the very purpose for the existence of
public enterprises. It can lead to arbitrary management decisions to reduce
losses through reduced services. If the return on investment criteria are to be
identical in the public and private sectors, it is questionable whether public
ownership is necessary. If return on investment is the goal, management
28 Report of the Auditor General of Canada, 1976, supra note 4, at 55-56. See
also, Report of the Auditor General of Canada, 1977, supra note 20, at 114.
29Report of the Auditor General of Canada, 1976, supra note 4, at 56. See also,
Report of the Auditor General of Canada, 1977, supra note 20, at 114.
80 Second Report of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts, supra note 3, at
16.
3 l Report of the Auditor General of Canada, 1977, supra note 20, at 121.
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would be tempted to exploit any monopolistic position it enjoys. These and
other problems will occur if Crown corporations are under strong pressures
to resemble closely the private commercial enterprises they replace. The pro-
posed legislation avoids this issue, and thus leaves Crown corporation man-
agement in a dilemma.
Natural conflict occurs between the outside accountability and the in-
ternal flexibility and innovativeness of Crown corporations. The Government
appears to want both accountability and internal flexibility. Outside review
of the operations of Crown corporations is bound to be incomplete. Total
accountability, or full disclosure, should be considered neither possible nor
efficient. Supervision for direction, control and accountabality purposes is
costly and could damage, as well as promote, performance in the public in-
terest. It has to be assumed that the Crown corporation's very being is pre-
mised on its carrying out broader policy objectives and that management will
behave in good faith and to the best of their ability. Complete direction,
control and accountability may inhibit a Crown corporation's internal flex-
ibility and innovativeness, and as well create the possibility of abuse on the
part of the Government for political purposes.
The optimum package of control and accountability depends very much
on the conditions of the specific case. The Government has recognized this to
some degree. But, the Government might have been wise in suggesting that
Crown corporations may have a variety of objectives such as: covering oper-
ating costs, providing new employment opportunities, promoting regional
development, prevention of foreign control, and institution of pricing choices
and controls. Imposing commercial criteria may be an overly simplistic
approach, and may fail to consider the situation in an individual Crown
corporation.
The Government and the Crown corporation have specific motivations,
internal conditions, outside constraints, differing versions of the broader policy
objectives, and their own internal interests. As a result, the interests of the
Crown corporation are not necessarily congruent with those of the Govern-
ment or the broader policy objectives which the Government supposedly
espouses. The question arises whether the mechanisms or procedures pro-
vided in the Government's proposals are sufficient to resolve possible differ-
ences. The Government is preoccupied with many aspects of the public interest
and ministers are burdened with administrative and political obligations.
These differences might be resolved through the reporting mechanisms pro-
posed. Whether sufficient time and effort will, or can, be devoted to the
examination of each Crown corporation's budgets and plans is doubtful.
Finally, the whole matter of the "broader policy objectives" arises. It is
questionable whether the Government has clearly defined these itself. The
reason for this is simple: it is a very complicated and difficult task with
public attitudes evolving over time, and the Government's perceptions of the
national interest changing. How the Government intends to give directives
relating to broader policy objectives when it may not have adequately defined
them should be interesting. Furthermore, Crown corporations are capable of
bearing only a certain amount of the broader policy objectives burden. In the
direction, control and accountability of units in business corporations, man-
1979] Note
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agement must know what its objectives are and the broad limits within which
it can formulate its own objectives. Objectives assist in developing criteria
for measuring performance and motivating management. In the case of Crown
corporations, this presents an even greater challenge for the Government as
it must transmit both its commercial criteria and the broader policy objectives
to management.
V. A SOCIAL AUDIT APPROACH
The Government's proposals and the features of the draft legislation
provide mechanisms for the financial direction, control and accountability
of those public enterprises considered to be Crown corporations. From this
review and analysis, the area of difficulty for the Government would appear
to be in the direction, control and accountability of Crown corporations with
respect to social objectives, that is, what is in the national interest. It is
assumed that all Crown corporations have been established for social pur-
poses; otherwise, the tasks they carry out may as well be performed by the
private sector.
The private sector is today expected to consider social objectives, usually
referred to as the social responsibilities of business.32 If private sector cor-
porations are being called upon to meet social responsibility requirements,
it should not be unreasonable to require public enterprise to do the same.
Private sector management are considering a variety of techniques that will
enable them to respond to their social responsibilities. One of these tech-
niques, the social audit, might be utilized to measure social objectives of
public enterprise.33 The social audit concept involves accountability for social
responsibilities, or social performance, through a systematic and audited
reporting system similar to that practised with financial statements. A com-
parable approach could be used to measure a public enterprise's discharge
82 The literature on this subject is vast. Theories of social responsibility are discussed
in works such as the following: Anshen, ed., Managing the Socially Responsible Cor-
poration (New York: Macmillan, 1974); Bell, The Corporation and Society in the 1970's
(1971), 24 Public Interest 5; Committee for Economic Development, Social Responsibil-
ities of Business Corporations (New York: Committee for Economic Development,
1971); lacoby, Corporate Power and Social Responsibility: A Blueprint for the Future,
Studies of the Modem Corporation, Columbia University Graduate School of Business
(New York: Macmillan, 1973); Preston and Post, Private Management and Public
Policy: The Principle of Public Responsibility, The Prentice-Hall Series in Economic
Institutions and Social Systems (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1975).
38 A substantial literature discusses the "social audit" concept (also referred to as
"social statement", "social report", and "business response to social priorities"). Selected
sources of further information are: Abt, The Social Audit of Management (New York:
AMACOM, 1977); Carroll, ed., Managing Corporate Social Responsibility (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1977); Churchill et al., The Measurement of Corporate Performance
(New York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1977); Corson and
Steiner, Measuring Business's Social Performance: The Corporate Social Audit (New
York: Committee for Economic Development, 1974); Dierkes and Bauer, eds., Corporate
Social Accounting, Praeger Special Studies in U.S. Economic, Social, and Political Issues
(New York: Praeger, 1973); Steiner, Business and Society, Random House Books in
Management (2d ed. New York: Random House, 1975); Tufte, ed., The Quantitative
Analysis of Social Problems, Addison-Wesley Series in Behavioral Science: Quantitative
Methods (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1970).
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of its responsibilities in the national interest where an attempt is made to
qualify values contributed to society (assets) and detriments to society for
action taken or not taken (liabilities). The asset or liability contributions
might be measured for such elements as: technological development and
knowledge creation; employment opportunities; environment and natural re-
source development and exploitation; community welfare and development;
contribution to taxation revenues; international trade and development; pro-
vision of infrastructure; and provision of venture capital.
A technique somewhat similar to the social unit is currently being used
for project appraisal by the Programme Evaluation Groups at the Depart-
ments of Industry, Trade and Commerce and Regional Economic Expansion.84
The approach attempts to assess commercial viability from the private sector
perspective and economic viability from the public sector perspective while
taking into consideration such external economic factors as taxation, foreign
exchange, labour benefits and foreign investment. Through this approach, the
project's contribution to society is measured and the level and type of public
support is determined according to the total project viability.
The social audit approach is not without its difficulties as indicated in
the literature cited. Implementation would present problems, but would also
present a challenge and provide an example to the private sector. Much of
the information required for such audits is most likely already available. It
would force cabinet ministers, civil servants, and managers to think through
the purpose for a public enterprise, and it would provide a method of evalua-
tion of the contribution of the public enterprise to the national interest as well
as provide a basis on which to plan future courses of action. The type of
analysis required in a social audit would not need to be done annually, but
possibly on a five-year basis with one-fifth of the public enterprises being
assessed each year.
Implementation details would require formulation, but the concept of
the social audit adapted to the accountability requirements for Canadian
public enterprises might well provide the mechanism for identifying and asses-
sing whether the national interest is being served.
VI. MORE OR LESS INDEPENDENCE?
The proposed legislation clearly is attempting to increase Government
influence over the financial and policy direction, control and accountability
of Crown corporations. This might be considered to be a logical event in light
of embarrassing incidents with Crown corporations in recent years. At the
same time, there are contradictions. The Government indicates that it wishes
Crown corporations to be independent so that they might attract entrepre-
neurially-minded management, yet it strictly controls chief executive salaries.
It holds Crown corporations responsible for broader social goals while evalu-
84 John C. Evans, A Financial and Economic Framework for Investment Appraisal.
Paper presented to the colloquim on Canadian Regional Planning and Development in
Transition, sponsored by the Department of Regional Economic Expansion and the
School of Urban and Regional Planning, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario,
February 16, 1977.
1979] Note 205
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ating performance on commercial criteria. Commercial secrecy is to be pre-
served by a degree of independence, but the Government demands thorough
reporting mechanisms and procedures, most of which enable the materials
produced to be made public.
The Government clearly intends to control the public enterprises referred
to as Crown corporations, and to insure that they operate in the national
interest. If all else fails, the Government power of direction is capable of
clearly defining the role of the Crown corporation.
The proposed legislation would apply to approximately fifty public en-
terprises. There are still hundreds of mixed enterprises and wholly-owned
corporations to which the legislation does not apply. For Crown corporations
the result would appear to be less independence. But, it should be remem-
bered that the Government is seeking to create viable commercial enterprises
of such Crown corporations as Air Canada and Canadian National Railways.
These efforts, through legislation, would remove such a corporation from the
Schedules of the FAA and, in effect, grant greater independence. The Gov-
ernment's announced process of "privatization" would also grant greater
independence.
It is questionable whether the proposals will fully accomplish their
objectives. The Government's intention to clarify its relationship to public
enterprises and to clear up the inconsistency and confusion relating to direc-
tion, control and accountability is a desirable one. If the proposed legislation
were enacted and strictly implemented, it would provide a coherent, on-going
review of Crown corporations instead of the ad hoc interventions of the past.
In order for this to occur, the same interpretation of the legislation would be
required by all concerned. The procedural requirements of the legislation can
be met, but there is reason to believe that, on the matters of broader policy
objectives versus commercial criteria, power of direction, principle of com-
pensation and borrowing powers, less unanimity will occur and problems in
direction, control and accountability will remain.
But, the proposals are only a start. Regulating the remaining public
enterprises in an effective manner so as to ensure commercial viability and
responsiveness to broader policy objectives will be an onerous task.
[VOL. 17, NO. I
